11 Yet notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, the but-for - or counterfactual - conception of actual causation has well-recognized problems. The standard definition of actual causation may appear straightforward at first: a defendant actually causes a plaintiff’s injury if the defendant’s action is a “but-for” cause of the injury, meaning that the injury would not have occurred “but for” (had it not been for) the defendant’s action. 9 No less complicated, however, are analyses of actual causation, 10 which will be the exclusive focus of this Note. 8Īs might be expected, inquiries into the nature of proximate causation are difficult, in part because of the thorny moral issues they raise and the byzantine exercises in line drawing they require. Hart and Tony Honoré - causation comprises two components: “actual causation” (or “causation in fact”) and “proximate causation.” 6 Whereas the former component concerns the minimum requirements an action must meet in order to qualify as a cause of an injury, 7 the latter provides criteria for determining which actual causes are susceptible to legal liability. 5 According to the dominant paradigm - articulated most notably by Professors H.L.A. It is perhaps unsurprising then that causation in tort law has been subject to rigorous analysis over the years by legal commentators 4 and the courts. The concept of causation is central to myriad areas of tort law: a defendant commits simple battery only if she “intentionally causes bodily contact” with another 1 she trespasses only if she “intentionally enters or causes tangible entry upon the land in possession of another” 2 she is liable for negligence only if she “ causes personal injury or property damage” to another.
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